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The Roots of America’s Global Role
John Bloxham
1 For  all  the  talk  of  Japan  in  the  1980s  or  China  today
overturning American hegemony, it remains the case that
no other state on Earth comes close to America in terms of
its unparalleled economic and military power, and will not
do so for, at least, decades to come. Accounts of how this
came  to  pass  tend  to  focus  on  America’s  reluctant
engagement in World War Two and the Cold War, followed
decades  later  by  the  implosion  of  the  USSR,  leaving
America as the world’s lone hegemon. In this narrative, the
pre-war years are dismissed as a period of isolationism in
foreign affairs. This book rejects that narrative. Thompson
claims that he developed his approach to American history
following  his  dissatisfaction  with  accounts  of  American
involvement  in  Vietnam.  The  explanations  for  American
involvement  fell  under  two  broad  umbrellas:  for  critics,
America undertook foreign wars at the behest of capitalists
in  order  to  maintain  American access  to  global  markets,
whilst for supporters of interventionism, security was the
overriding concern. For supporters of  the security thesis,
the world’s descent into two world wars demonstrated the
need for America to play the role of global policeman, and if
America  forsook  that  role,  hostile  foreign  powers  would
again  rise  up  to  eventually  threaten  America  itself.
Thompson  later  adds  a  third  explanation:  belief  in
America’s  unique  mission  to  spread  freedom  and
democracy across the globe. 
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By examining America’s rise to global power from the
end  of  the  nineteenth-century  to  the  1950s,  Thompson
provides an alternative account. In brief, it was only at the
end of the nineteenth-century that the United States had
the  economic  capability  to  play  a  significant  global  role.
However,  she  only  assumed  that  role  in  fits  and  starts
because  of  an  inherent  sense  of  caution  which  was  only
gradually overcome. The capitalist, security and crusading
factors all played a role, but it was really thanks to a shift in
the outlook of America’s leaders (the ‘sense of power’ from
the book’s title) that America gradually took on the massive
global  commitments  that  she  retains  today.  The  book
contains  six  chapters  alongside  the  Introduction  and
Conclusion.  Chapter  One  examines  America’s  increasing
power from the post-Civil War period to 1914; Chapter Two
covers  America’s  first  flirtation  with  global  hegemony
during  World  War  One  and  with  Woodrow  Wilson’s
ambitious vision for post-war cooperation from 1914-1920;
Chapter  Three  covers  the  isolationist  reaction  from
1920-1938; Chapter Four looks at the 1938-1941 build-up to
America’s entry in World War Two; Chapter Five describes
America’s  full-scale  commitment  to  its  global  role  during
that  war;  and  Chapter  Six  explores  America’s  first
peacetime commitment to its new role of global policeman.
3
Thompson argues that the spectacular growth in post-
Civil  War  America’s  economic  power,  and  military
capabilities,  should– in  realist  theory–have resulted in an
almost  immediate  and  sustained  commitment  to  a  much
more interventionist foreign policy. The fact that pre-World
War One American interventions were episodic and fitful is
seen  by  Thompson  as  evidence  of  the  weakness of  the
realist interpretation. Thompson contends that even in the
realists’ worst case scenario, in which a hostile power rises
to  dominate  Europe  and  Asia,  the  costs  of  defending
America  would  still  be  far  lower  than  America  currently
spends  on  maintaining  its  global  position  of  dominance.
However, even if one accepts Thompson’s point that such a
hostile  power  would  not  attack  America  (so  long  as  it
maintained nuclear deterrent), such a power could still do
America  severe  economic  harm  using  trade  sanctions.
Thompson  suggests  that  including  such  economic
arguments in a debate over national defence stretches the
term  beyond  its  natural  scope;  but  if  we  agree  with
Clausewitz that war is a continuation of politics by other
means, there is no reason to exclude such major non-war
considerations  from  defence  planning.  In  addition,  since
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Thompson’s argument in this instance is built entirely on a
comparison  of  the  costs  under  the  isolationist  and
interventionist options, it seems reasonable to include the
indirect costs that American could potentially suffer in a
non-war standoff against a hostile power.
4
Thompson also downplays the role of interests, such
as finding foreign markets for American goods or keeping
European powers out of the Western hemisphere. He is on
firmer  ground  with  this  criticism  of  the  capitalist
explanation  for  American  interventionism.  He  is  right  to
point  out  that  foreign  economic  interests  were  minimal
during much of  the  early  period of  America’s  expansion.
And  his  point  that  the  post-war  economic  system
constructed by America can just as plausibly be viewed as
example  of  economic  policies  being  used  to  support
America’s global role as the reverse, is apt. He could also
have  strengthened  his  case  further  by  citing  all  of  the
examples of costly American intervention which were never
conceivably going to produce offsetting economic returns.
Again, this does not mean that economic motives have not
occasionally driven American intervention,  and Thompson
does not paper over pertinent examples. 
5
Thompson spends less time debunking the missionary
zeal  explanation  although,  as  with  the  security  and
economic  factors,  he  does  recognize  it  as  a  contributing
motive.  One  key  piece  of  evidence  for  Thompson is  that
modern  polling  shows  that  the  public  place  democracy
promotion  abroad  as  less  important  than  security  and
economy.  This  may well  be true as  far  as  it  goes,  but  it
leaves  a  lot  of  questions  unanswered:  does  the  public
attitude match the attitude of the elite running American
foreign policy? Do the public favour democracy promotion if
it  does  not  cost  too  much?  What  if  the  democracy  and
security  motives  converge  (as  seemed  to  be  the  case  in
Iraq)? And so on.
6
After  dismissing alternative explanations,  Thompson
argues  that  all  of  America’s  wars  since  the  nineteenth-
century  have  been  “wars  of  choice.”  The  reality  of
America’s  vast  resources  has  given  her  the  ability  to
intervene abroad and helped to  shift  the  mind-set  of  US
leaders–essentially, they intervene because they can. It was
“consciousness of America’s new power and the belief that
its  enhanced  international  status  entitled  it  to  greater
prerogatives and brought wider responsibilities” (26) that
drove shifts in American foreign policy. Thompson cites a
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number  of  thinkers,  including  Morgenthau,  who  argued
that the drive to dominate is part of the human psyche. As
Thompson  relates,  even  2,500  years  ago,  the  Athenian
historian Thucydides portrayed the Athenians telling the
soon to be conquered Melians that “it is a necessary law of
nature to rule whatever one can” (V.105). In this regard, the
general  benevolence  of  the  United  States  in  historical
perspective is more striking than its position of hegemony.
7
Thompson is correct that existing mono-explanations
fail to account for America’s role, but then would we expect
a single explanation to account for every facet of America’s
international role over the past 100-plus years? Or for every
actor who influenced that role? Even Vietnam, the war that
fuelled  Thompson’s  initial  dissatisfaction  with  existing
analyses,  was  not  as  black  and  white  at  the  time  as
Thompson suggests. It is easy to see after the event that the
fall  of  Vietnam did not  lead to  a  Communist  takeover of
Asia, but at the time the ‘domino’ theory, in which it was
expected  that  the  fall  of  South  Vietnam  would  lead  to
Communists  taking  over  neighbouring  states,  was  still
popular  in  the  foreign  policy  establishment.  Even  if  we
accept  the  flaws  that  Thompson  finds  with  existing
explanations, there is no reason to suggest that each one
did  not  have  some  influence,  on  some  actors,  at  some
periods.  One only needs to go back to George W. Bush’s
invasion  of  Iraq  to  see  that  different  members  of  the
administration focused more or less on different factors in
their  motives  for  the  invasion:  economic  (oil),  security
(WMD) and missionary zeal  (the belief  that a democratic
Iraq would help to spread freedom and democracy to the
rest of the Middle East).
8
A  key  strength  of  Thompson’s  work  is  his  even-
handed and thorough level of detail, which means that he
includes  evidence  which  weakens  his  own  case.  For
example,  despite  playing  down  the  economic  motives  of
America in this period,  he dutifully reports the economic
rhetoric of American thinkers and actors at this time, who
believed that the American market suffered from a “glut”
that  could  only  be  eased  through  opening  up  foreign
markets. This raises the possibility that the perception that
America needed to dominate foreign markets might have
been  real,  even  if  it  was  the  case  that  the  American
economy was still only reliant on export earnings to a tiny
degree. One problem is that Thompson’s book is ostensibly
about  a  particular  period,  but  the  examples  he  uses  to
buttress his  case are drawn from a much larger span of
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time. Some of the comparisons are also oddly jarring. For
example, when discussing the pre-World War One difference
in  public  opinion  towards  foreign  investment  losses  by
British and American investors, he plausibly suggests that
the  explanation  may have  been the  greater  share  of  the
economy  made  up  by  foreign  investments  in  Britain
compared to America; however, the statistical comparison
used to show this is a 1910 figure for Britain and a 1973
figure for America. 
9
Thompson’s thesis is more sophisticated than any one
of the opposing explanations, and the psychological aspect
is valuable. But at the same time, in casting each of those
explanations aside he oversimplifies. As has been suggested
above,  Thompson  is  excellent  at  showing  that  popular
explanations  for  the  growth  of  America’s  role  cannot
account  for  every  particular,  but  he  does  not  completely
refute  the  possibility  that  the  three  explanations  might
together  provide  most  of  the  story,  providing  we  accept
them as  interdependent  and inter-related.  Despite  falling
just a little way short of its ambitious explanatory aims, this
is  a  valuable  and  intriguing  work,  which  will  offer  fresh
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